Concrete and abstract ways to deontology: Cognitive capacity moderates construal level effects on moral judgments☆
Concrete and abstract ways to deontology: Cognitive capacity moderates construal level effects on moral judgments☆
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.jesp.2014.07.002
复制
发表时间：
2014-11
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
Anita Körner;Sabine Volk
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Anita Körner;Sabine Volk
双重过程模型和解释水平理论为道德判断研究提供了理论基础。结合这些方法，我们认为可用的处理能力和解释水平相互作用，以预测道德判断。具体而言，具体解释应该增强自发判断的可视化，从而导致更强烈的情绪反应和更多的道义决定。相反，抽象解释应该将注意力引向抽象的道德原则，以进行深思熟虑的判断，再次促进义务论决策。在三个实验中，我们操纵解释水平（抽象与具体）和处理能力的可用性（实验1：通过短与长考虑时间；实验2和3：通过认知与视觉干扰）并评估道德困境判断。当处理能力降低时，参与者在具体（相对于抽象）解释下做出更多的义务论判断。然而，有了足够的处理能力，这种模式就会逆转，从而在抽象（相对于具体）解释下产生更多的义务论判断。这些结果通过提出一种通过抽象审议的替代途径来实现义务论，扩展了先前将义务论决策与情绪反应联系起来的工作。
Moral judgment research has been informed by both dual-process models and construal level theory. Combining these approaches, we argue that available processing capacity and construal level interact to predict moral judgment. Specifically, concrete construal should enhance visualization for spontaneous judgments, leading to stronger emotional reactions and more deontological decisions. In contrast, abstract construal should direct attention to abstract moral principles for deliberate judgments, again facilitating deontological decisions. In 3 experiments, we manipulated both construal level (abstract vs. concrete) and the availability of processing capacity (Experiment 1: via short vs. long deliberation time; Experiments 2 and 3: via cognitive vs. visual interference) and assessed moral dilemma judgments. Participants made more deontological judgments under concrete (vs. abstract) construal when processing capacity was reduced. With sufficient processing capacity, however, this pattern reversed, leading to more deontological judgments under abstract (vs. concrete) construal. These results extend previous work linking deontological decisions with emotional reactions, by suggesting an alternative pathway to deontology through abstract deliberation.