Deceptive Logic Locking for Hardware Integrity Protection Against Machine Learning Attacks
Deceptive Logic Locking for Hardware Integrity Protection Against Machine Learning Attacks
复制标题
用于硬件完整性保护的欺骗性逻辑锁定，防止机器学习攻击
DOI：
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
R. Leupers
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dominik Sisejkovic;Farhad Merchant;Lennart M. Reimann;R. Leupers
逻辑锁定已成为一种重要的键驱动技术，用于保护集成电路的完整性。然而，最近引入了新的基于机器学习的攻击来挑战锁定方案的安全基础。这些攻击能够在不访问激活的电路的情况下恢复相当大比例的密钥。本文通过两个焦点来解决这一问题。首先，我们提出了一个理论模型来测试可以通过机器学习来利用的与密钥相关的结构泄漏的锁定方案。其次，在理论模型的基础上，我们引入了D-MUX：一种基于欺骗性多路复用器的逻辑锁定方案，该方案对利用结构的机器学习攻击具有弹性。通过D-MUX的设计，我们揭示了现有基于复用器的锁定方案中的一个主要谬误，即结构分析攻击的形式。最后，对D-MUX进行了广泛的成本评估。据我们所知，D-MUX是第一个机器学习弹性锁定方案，能够防御所有已知的基于学习的攻击。因此，本文的工作为机器学习时代下一代逻辑锁的设计和评估提供了一个起点。
Logic locking has emerged as a prominent key-driven technique to protect the integrity of integrated circuits. However, novel machine-learning-based attacks have recently been introduced to challenge the security foundations of locking schemes. These attacks are able to recover a significant percentage of the key without having access to an activated circuit. This article address this issue through two focal points. First, we present a theoretical model to test locking schemes for key-related structural leakage that can be exploited by machine learning. Second, based on the theoretical model, we introduce D-MUX: a deceptive multiplexer-based logic-locking scheme that is resilient against structure-exploiting machine learning attacks. Through the design of D-MUX, we uncover a major fallacy in the existing multiplexer-based locking schemes in the form of a structural-analysis attack. Finally, an extensive cost evaluation of D-MUX is presented. To the best of our knowledge, D-MUX is the first machine-learning-resilient locking scheme capable of protecting against all known learning-based attacks. Hereby, the presented work offers a starting point for the design and evaluation of future-generation logic locking in the era of machine learning.
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DOI：
10.1109/paine49178.2020.9337734
发表时间：
2020-07
期刊：
2020 IEEE Physical Assurance and Inspection of Electronics (PAINE)
影响因子：
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作者：
Ayush Jain;Tanjidur Rahman;Ujjwal Guin
通讯作者：
Ayush Jain;Tanjidur Rahman;Ujjwal Guin
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
IEEE Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium
影响因子：
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作者：
Alaql, Abdulrahman;Forte, Domenic;Bhunia, Swarup
通讯作者：
Bhunia, Swarup
DOI：
10.1109/iccad.2017.8203759
发表时间：
2017-11
期刊：
2017 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD)
影响因子：
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作者：
H. Zhou;Ruifeng Jiang;Shuyu Kong
通讯作者：
H. Zhou;Ruifeng Jiang;Shuyu Kong
DOI：
10.1145/3400302.3415667
发表时间：
2020-09
期刊：
2020 IEEE/ACM International Conference On Computer Aided Design (ICCAD)
影响因子：
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作者：
Hadi Mardani Kamali;K. Z. Azar;H. Homayoun;Avesta Sasan
通讯作者：
Hadi Mardani Kamali;K. Z. Azar;H. Homayoun;Avesta Sasan
CAS-Lock：一种安全-腐败权衡弹性逻辑锁定方案
DOI：
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
IACR transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
影响因子：
--
作者：
Shakya, Bicky;Xu, Xiaolin;Tehranipoor, Mark;Forte, Domenic
通讯作者：
Forte, Domenic