Booters — An analysis of DDoS-as-a-service attacks
Booters — An analysis of DDoS-as-a-service attacks
复制标题
DOI：
10.1109/inm.2015.7140298
复制
发表时间：
2015-05
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. J. Santanna-J.;R. V. Rijswijk-Deij;Rick Hofstede;A. Sperotto;Mark Wierbosch;L. Granville;A. Pras
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. J. Santanna-J.;R. V. Rijswijk-Deij;Rick Hofstede;A. Sperotto;Mark Wierbosch;L. Granville;A. Pras
2012年，荷兰国家研究和教育网络（SURFnet）观察到针对教育机构的大量分布式拒绝服务（DDoS）攻击。这些攻击足以导致数百名学生的在线考试被取消。令人惊讶的是，这些攻击是由学生从网站上购买的，被称为Booters。这些网站提供DDoS攻击作为付费服务（DDoS即服务），费用从1美元开始。自从SURFnet首次发现这个问题以来，Booters已被多次用于对SURFnet选区的学校进行攻击。然而，我们对Booters的特性知之甚少，尤其是它们的攻击结构。这是减轻这些攻击所需的重要信息。在本文中，我们分析了超过250 GB的网络数据从真实的攻击的基础上，14个不同的Booters的特点。我们的研究结果表明，Booters构成了一个不应低估的真实的威胁，特别是因为我们的分析表明，他们可以轻松地在现有基础设施的基础上增加火力。
In 2012, the Dutch National Research and Education Network, SURFnet, observed a multitude of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against educational institutions. These attacks were effective enough to cause the online exams of hundreds of students to be cancelled. Surprisingly, these attacks were purchased by students from Web sites, known as Booters. These sites provide DDoS attacks as a paid service (DDoS-as-a-Service) at costs starting from 1 USD. Since this problem was first identified by SURFnet, Booters have been used repeatedly to perform attacks on schools in SURFnet's constituency. Very little is known, however, about the characteristics of Booters, and particularly how their attacks are structure. This is vital information needed to mitigate these attacks. In this paper we analyse the characteristics of 14 distinct Booters based on more than 250 GB of network data from real attacks. Our findings show that Booters pose a real threat that should not be underestimated, especially since our analysis suggests that they can easily increase their firepower based on their current infrastructure.