Collectives' Duties and Collectivization Duties
Collectives' Duties and Collectivization Duties
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DOI：
10.1080/00048402.2012.717533
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发表时间：
2013-06-01
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Collins, Stephanie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Collins, Stephanie
看似合理的是，只有道德代理人才能承担要求行动的责任。这对哪些组织可以承担要求行动的职责施加了限制：只有具有足够结构的组织才有必要的代理机构。此外，如果责任意味着能力，那么道德代理人(无论是个人还是集体)只能对他们能够执行的行为承担责任。因此，个别代理人能否担负起执行只有集体才能执行的行动的职责是值得怀疑的。这似乎使我们在分配责任时感到困惑，因为在这种情况下，只有集体才能采取一些道德上合乎情理的行动，而不存在集体。但我认为，我们并没有不知所措。这篇文章概述了一种在没有集体的情况下分配责任而不是集体行为的新方法。具体地说，我们应该把集团化的责任分配给个人。这些是采取步骤形成集体的个人责任，然后集体产生了对行动的责任。我给出了个人何时有集体化义务的标准，并讨论了这些义务对其承担者的要求。
Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties: only groups with sufficient structurecall them collectives'have the necessary agency. Moreover, if duties imply ability then moral agents (of both the individual and collectives varieties) can bear duties only over actions they are able to perform. It is thus doubtful that individual agents can bear duties to perform actions that only a collective could perform. This appears to leave us at a loss when assigning duties in circumstances where only a collective could perform some morally desirable action and no collective exists. But, I argue, we are not at a loss. This article outlines a new way of assigning duties over collective acts when there is no collective. Specifically, we should assign collectivization duties to individuals. These are individual duties to take steps towards forming a collective, which then incurs a duty over the action. I give criteria for when individuals have collectivization duties and discuss the demands these duties place on their bearers.