Impact on Agency Problems of China's Reform of the Split-Share Structure
Impact on Agency Problems of China's Reform of the Split-Share Structure
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DOI：
10.2753/ree1540-496x4805s303
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发表时间：
2012-09
影响因子：
4
通讯作者：
Tzu-Yun Tseng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tzu-Yun Tseng
中国独特的股权分置结构导致了严重的代理问题。此外，文献表明，自由现金流和过度投资问题在中国的上市公司中普遍存在。本文考察了股权分置改革对代理问题的影响。本文发现股权分置改革后投资-现金流敏感度降低，这是中国所在上市公司股权分置改革后代理问题减少的证据。结果表明，股权分置改革缓解了中国所在上市公司的代理问题。
China's unique split-share structure has resulted in serious agency problems. Moreover, the literature has shown that free cash flow and overinvestment problems are common in China's listed firms. This paper investigates the impact of the split-share structure reform on agency problems. The paper finds a decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity after the reform of the split-share structure, which is evidence for a decrease in agency problems in China's listed firms after this reform. The result implies that the split-share structure reform has eased the agency problems in China's listed firms.