Efficient and Strongly Secure Password-based Server Aided Key Exchange
Efficient and Strongly Secure Password-based Server Aided Key Exchange
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-540-89754-5_14
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发表时间：
2008-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kazuki Yoneyama
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kazuki Yoneyama
Cliff等在ACNS ' 06中提出了基于密码的服务器辅助密钥交换（PSAKE），作为三方设置（3-party PAKE）中基于密码的身份验证密钥交换之一，即两个具有不同密码的客户端在其对应的服务器的帮助下交换会话密钥。尽管他们还研究了第三方PAKE的强安全性定义，但他们的安全模型不够强大，因为存在无法捕获的理想安全属性。在本文中，我们定义了一个新的形式化的第三方PAKE安全模型，它比以前的模型更强。我们的模型捕获了所有已知的三方PAKE的理想安全要求，例如抵抗密钥泄露冒充，服务器的临时私钥泄漏以及无法检测的在线字典攻击。此外，我们还提出了一种改进PSAKE的方案，该方案具有客户端的最优轮数，在我们的模型意义上是安全的。
In ACNS’06, Cliff, et al. proposed the password-based server aided key exchange (PSAKE) as one of password-based authenticated key exchanges in the three-party setting (3-party PAKE) in which two clients with different passwords exchange a session key with the help of their corresponding server. Though they also studied a strong security definition of the 3-party PAKE, their security model is not strong enough because there are desirable security properties which cannot be captured. In this paper, we define a new formal security model of the 3-party PAKE which is stronger than the previous model. Our model captures all known desirable security requirements of the 3-party PAKE, like the resistance to key-compromise impersonation, to the leakage of ephemeral private keys of servers and to the undetectable on-line dictionary attack. Also, we propose a new scheme as an improvement of PSAKE with the optimal number of rounds for a client, which is secure in the sense of our model.