Only the Final Outcome Matters: Persistent Effects of Efforts in Dynamic Moral Hazard
Only the Final Outcome Matters: Persistent Effects of Efforts in Dynamic Moral Hazard
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只有最终结果才重要：动态道德风险中努力的持续影响
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1543518
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ryo Ogawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ryo Ogawa
我们分析了一个动态委托代理问题，其中代理在每个阶段的努力具有很强的持续性效应。我们证明了一个简单的契约，在奖励只取决于最终结果的意义上，被解释为委托人优化问题中导出的最优契约。本文还讨论了这种简单支付方案的最优性关键取决于不同努力序列下最终结果的一阶随机优势。
We analyze a dynamic principal–agent problem in which the agent’s effort in each period has strong persisitent effects. We show that a simple contract, in the sense that the reward depends only on the final outcome, is explained as the optimal contract derived in the principal’s optimization problem. The paper also discusses that the optimality of such a simple payment scheme crucially depends on the first-order stochastic dominance of the final outcome under various effort sequences.