Auctions, Matching and the Law of Aggregate Demand
Auctions, Matching and the Law of Aggregate Demand
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拍卖、撮合和总需求定律
DOI：
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Paul R. Milgrom
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Hatfield;Paul R. Milgrom
我们开发了一个模型匹配的合同，其中包括，作为特殊情况下，大学招生问题，凯尔索-克劳福德劳动力市场匹配模型，和递增包拍卖。我们引入了一个新的“总需求定律”的离散异质工人的情况下，并表明，当工人的替代品，法律是满足利润最大化的公司的需求。当工人是替代品和法律是满意的，真实的报告是一个占主导地位的战略，工人提供拍卖/匹配算法的工人。我们还参数化了一大类满足这两个条件的偏好。
We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and ascending package auctions. We introduce a new “law of aggregate demand” for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that, when workers are substitutes, the law is satisfied by the demands of profit maximizing firms. When workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied, truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker-offering auction/matching algorithm. We also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions.