Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia
Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia
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非正式政治中的正式宪法：后苏联欧亚大陆的制度与民主化
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发表时间：
2011
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通讯作者：
H. Hale
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作者：
H. Hale
在腐败普遍严重、法治薄弱的混合型政体中，正式宪法如何影响民主化的前景？人们通常认为，要么是他们制定了“游戏规则”，因为被遵守而产生影响，要么是他们无关紧要，因为被非正式的政治所压倒。事实上，集体行动的逻辑表明，宪法确实很重要，但通过塑造非正式的政治安排和遵守宪法同样重要。总统制宪法，通过信息效应和焦点效应，产生了对未来非正式权力的期望，鼓励庇护网络围绕总统领导的“单一金字塔”权力协调无视法律的做法。相比之下，分权行政体制的信息和焦点效应创造了期望，使围绕单一赞助人的庇护网络的协调复杂化，促进了“竞争金字塔”政治。为了隔离正式宪法设计的影响并排除其他原因，我们采用了一种严格控制的过程追踪配对比较方法，以2005 - 2010年的乌克兰和吉尔吉斯斯坦为例，解释为什么乌克兰的橙色革命产生了真正的民主开放（即使是短暂的），而吉尔吉斯斯坦的郁金香革命却没有。
How do formal constitutions impact the prospects for democratization in hybrid regimes, where corruption is typically high and rule of law weak? It is often assumed either that they set “rules of the game,” having effects by being followed, or that they do not matter, being overwhelmed by informal politics. In fact, a logic of collective action reveals that constitutions do matter, but as much by shaping informal political arrangements as by being obeyed. Presidentialist constitutions, through an information effect and a focal effect, generate expectations of future informal power that encourage clientelistic networks to coordinate law-disregarding practices around a “single pyramid” of power led by the president. The information and focal effects of divided-executive constitutions, by contrast, create expectations that complicate the coordination of clientelistic networks around a single patron, promoting “competing-pyramid” politics. To isolate the impact of formal constitutional design and rule out other causes, a tightly controlled process-tracing paired comparison is employed using Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan during 2005–10, explaining why Ukraine’s Orange Revolution produced a true democratic opening (even if short lived) while Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution did not.