Relational Contracts, Multitasking, and Job Design
Relational Contracts, Multitasking, and Job Design
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关系契约、多任务处理和工作设计
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Anja Schöttner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Anja Schöttner
本文分析了在重复委托代理关系中，只有一个收缩和不完善的三个任务，其贡献的企业价值是不可验证的绩效指标的最优工作设计。任务可以分配给一个或两个代理。代理人的额外任务加强了他的关系契约。因此，广泛的任务分配是最佳的时，业绩衡量强烈扭曲的激励两项任务的工作。如果这两个任务是替代的，情况更有可能是这样。
This article analyzes optimal job design in a repeated principal-agent relationship when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for three tasks whose contribution to firm value is nonverifiable. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. Assigning an additional task to an agent strengthens his relational contract. Therefore, broad task assignments are optimal when the performance measure strongly distorts incentives for the two-task job. This is more likely to be the case if these two tasks are substitutes.