Bank Restructuring and Soft Budget Constraints in Financial Transition

Bank Restructuring and Soft Budget Constraints in Financial Transition
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金融转型中的银行重组和软预算约束

DOI:
10.1006/jjie.1995.1022
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发表时间:
1995
影响因子:
2.9
通讯作者:
G. Roland
G. Roland
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Erik Berglöf;G. Roland

文献摘要

被引文献

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本文在一个形式化的模型中分析了在具有银行中介金融的转轨经济中实现金融约束的问题。即使银行对为无利可图的公司再融资没有内在的兴趣,他们仍然可以利用政府的软弱。通过赌政府救助,银行有助于软化企业的预算约束。我们发现,质量差的贷款组合,没有抵押品和低银行资本化的关键因素,解释软预算约束和反复的银行救助转型经济体。银行准备金有助于加强预算约束,但初始资本化水平较高,是减轻信贷紧缩对企业潜在负面影响的必要条件。我们发现,硬度和企业流动性之间的权衡是更严重的贷款组合的质量差。如果一家银行投资于筛选或监测项目,以提高投资组合的质量,也会出现类似的权衡。在某些条件下,政府应该让银行在监督和筛选方面进行投资,以获得硬预算约束,而不是让银行将准备金用于此类投资。我们进一步表明,所有的不良贷款转移到一个单独的机构,医院机构,从来都不是最优的,而部分转移可能有助于加强预算约束。
This paper analyses in a formal model the problem of achieving financial discipline in a transitional economy with bank-intermediated finance. Even if banks have no intrinsic interest in refinancing unprofitable firms, they may still exploit the softness of government. By gambling for government bailouts, banks contribute to softening the budget constraints of enterprises. We show that the poor quality of loan portfolios, the absence of collateral and low bank capitalization are key elements explaining soft budget constraints and repeated bank bailouts in transitional economies. Bank reserves help in hardening budget constraints, but high initial levels of capitalization are necessary to mitigate potential negative effects of a credit crunch for enterprises. We show that the trade-off between hardness and enterprise liquidity is more severe when loan portfolios are of poor quality. A similar trade-off arises if a bank invests in screening or monitoring projects to improve the quality of portfolios. Under certain conditions the government should make capitalization contingent on banks investing in monitoring and screening in order to obtain hard budget constraints rather than to let banks use reserves for such investments. We further show that transfers of all non-performing loans to a separate institution, a hospital agency, is never optimal, whereas partial transfers may serve to harden budget constraints.