Kant and Husserl on the Synthetic A Priori
Kant and Husserl on the Synthetic A Priori
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康德和胡塞尔论综合先验
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发表时间：
1972
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通讯作者：
K. Gallagher
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作者：
K. Gallagher
对康德的综合先验解释的最重要的挑战来自胡塞尔和现象学家的阵营。Tlieir的案例特别有趣，因为与完全否认综合先验判断的发生的哲学家不同，他们认为康德不适当地限制了这种判断的范围。这种判断不仅适用于他所赋予的相对狭窄的领域，而且还可以适用于一个巨大的范围;只是因为康德误解了先天综合的本质，他才没有把握住这一点。这是胡塞尔自己的信念，也得到了他的许多门徒和合作者的响应，尤其是早期的现象学家。现在，综合的先验问题并不是，尽管表面上看，一个语法上瘾的哲学家之间的技术争论，而是真理的本质问题开始关注的一点。因此，应该证明有必要明确确定这一争端中的争议所在。开始，我们应该了解胡塞尔如何认为自己与康德不同。他在《逻辑研究》中十分肯定康德的错误是什么。没有迹象表明，他在阐述分析判断与综合判断之间的区别时，与康德有什么不同。康德把前者定义为一种判断，在这种判断中，谓词包含在主语的概念中，而后者定义为一种判断，在这种判断中，谓词不包含在主语的概念中。“所有的身体都是延伸的”是第一个例子;“所有的身体都是沉重的”是第二个例子。胡塞尔并没有表示对这种表述方式有任何异议。他确实更一般地阐述了问题，但这是对康德的一种提炼，而不是修改。他说：“我们可以把分析上必然的命题定义为其真理性完全独立于其对象的特殊内容的命题。"在一个分析命题中，在不改变命题的逻辑形式的前提下，必须有可能用一个空洞的形式的东西来代替所有有内容的材料"这确实是康德的概括，而不是修改，可以很容易地显示。因为任何一个命题，如果谓语包含在主语中，那么这个包含是明显的，
Among the most important challenges to Kant's Interpretation of the synthetic a priori has been that issuing from the camp of Husserl and the phenomenologists. Tlieir case is especially interesting because, unlike the empiricists, who deny the occurrence of synthetic a priori judgments altogether, they contend that Kant has unduly restricted the ränge of such judgments. Far from applying only to the relatively narrow field which he granted them, there is an enormous ränge over which such judgments are possible; only because Kant misunderstood the nature of the synthetic a priori did he fail to grasp this. This was the conviction of Husserl himself, and it was echoed by many of his disciples and collaborators, especially among the earlier phenomenologists. Now, the problem of the synthetic a priori is not, in spite of appearances, a technical wrangle among grammaticallyaddicted philosophers, but is rather one point at which the question of the nature of truth comes to focus. It should therefore prove worthwhile to determine äs clearly äs possible just what is at issue in this dispute. To begin with, we ought to understand how Husserl takes himself to be differing from Kant. He is quite certain in the Logical Investigations what Kant's mistake was. There is no indication on his part that he differs from Kant in his way of stating the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. The former is defined by Kant äs a judgment in which the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject, the latter äs one in which the predicate is not so contained. "All bodies are extended" is an example of the first; "All bodies are heavy" an example of the second. Husserl does not indicate any quarrel with this way of putting things. He does formulate matters much more generally, but this is meant to be a refinement of Kant, rather than a modification. "We may define analytically necessary propositions", he says, as propositions whose truth is completely independent of the peculiar content of their objects", and he adds: "In an analytic proposition it must be possible, without altering the proposition's logical form, to replace all material which has content, with an empty formal Something" That this really is a generalization of Kant and not a modification, can be readily shown. For any proposition in which the predicate is contained in the subject would be a proposition in which this Containment is apparent when that