Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World
Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World
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生活在不断变化的世界中的理性参与者的快速均衡选择
DOI：
10.1111/1468-0262.00181
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ady Pauzner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Frankel;K. Burdzy;Ady Pauzner
我们研究一个协调博弈，随机变化的收益和小摩擦，在不断变化的行动。仅使用反向归纳法，我们发现，玩家必须协调的风险主导的均衡。更准确地说，一个连续的完全理性的参与者随机匹配玩一个对称的2x2游戏。收益矩阵根据随机游走而变化。参与者观察这些收益和行动的人口分布，因为他们的发展。游戏有摩擦：改变策略的机会来自于独立的随机过程，因此参与者在一段时间内被锁定在他们的行动中。当摩擦消失时，每个参与者都会忽略其他参与者正在做的事情，并在第一次机会时转向风险主导型行动。在某些情况下，当摩擦保持为正时，就会出现历史依赖。
We study a coordination game with randomly changing payoffs and small frictions in changing actions. Using only backwards induction, we find that players must coordinate on the risk-dominant equilibrium. More precisely, a continuum of fully rational players are randomly matched to play a symmetric 2 x 2 game. The payoff matrix changes according to a random walk. Players observe these payoffs and the population distribution of actions as they evolve. The game has frictions: opportunities to change strategies arrive from independent random processes, so that the players are locked into their actions for some time. As the frictions disappear, each player ignores what the others are doing and switches at her first opportunity to the risk-dominant action. History dependence emerges in some cases when frictions remain positive.