Do people rely on the self-interested maximization of others?: an experimental test
Do people rely on the self-interested maximization of others?: an experimental test
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人们是否依赖他人的自利最大化？：实验测试
DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.40.2.252
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发表时间：
1994
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Richard O. Beil
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Beard;Richard O. Beil
虽然在经济学理论中普遍存在着代理人从事最大化行为的假设，但它不同于代理人愿意依赖他人最大化行为的假设。本文使用实验方法对这一区别进行了实证检验。利用一系列基于简单的、两人广泛形式的完全信息博弈的实验处理，我们发现了强有力的证据，表明表面上理性的人往往不愿依赖他人的自利行为，尽管观察到最大化博弈的近乎普遍性。
The assumption that agents engage in maximizing behavior, while ubiquitous in economic theory, differs from the assumption that agents are willing to rely on the maximizing behavior of others. This paper offers an empirical examination of this distinction using experimental methods. Utilizing a series of experimental treatments based on a simple, two player extensive form game of perfect information, we find strong evidence that apparently rational people are often unwilling to rely on the self-interested behavior of others, despite the observed near universality of maximizing play.