A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups

A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups
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DOI:
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01001.x
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发表时间:
2006-12-01
期刊:
影响因子:
8
通讯作者:
Wolfenzon, Daniel
Wolfenzon, Daniel
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Almeida, Heitor V.;Wolfenzon, Daniel

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我们提供了一个新的理论基础,在家族企业集团的金字塔所有权。金字塔允许一个家族使用其已经控制的公司的所有留存收益来建立一个新公司,并与原公司的股东分享新公司的非转移收益。我们的模型是一致的,最近的证据表明,在一些金字塔的所有权和控制权之间的一个小的分离,并可以区分金字塔和双层股票,即使任何一种方法可以实现相同的偏离一股一票。该模型的其他预测与系统和轶事证据一致。
We provide a new rationale for pyramidal ownership in family business groups. A pyramid allows a family to access all retained earnings of a firm it already controls to set up a new firm, and to share the new firm's nondiverted payoff with shareholders of the original firm. Our model is consistent with recent evidence of a small separation between ownership and control in some pyramids, and can differentiate between pyramids and dual-class shares, even when either method can achieve the same deviation from one share-one vote. Other predictions of the model are consistent with both systematic and anecdotal evidence.