Pricing game of celebrities in sponsored viral marketing in online social networks with a greedy advertising platform
Pricing game of celebrities in sponsored viral marketing in online social networks with a greedy advertising platform
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在线社交网络中具有贪婪广告平台的赞助病毒式营销中名人的定价游戏
DOI：
10.1109/icc.2016.7511396
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yi Long
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zhiyi Lu;Haojie Zhou;V. Li;Yi Long
在过去的十年中，研究如何通过正确选择种子节点来引发在线社交网络（Online Social Networks, OSNs）中大规模级联的影响最大化问题（IMP）已经得到了广泛的研究，但关于这些种子节点或名人如何通过促进级联获得报酬的一个重要而现实的问题却很少得到解决。为了被广告平台选中，实现自身效用最大化，每个名人自然会根据其他名人的决定和自己的影响力来确定自己的推广级联价格。本文将名人定价问题表述为一个以名人为参与者的定价博弈问题。我们证明了广告平台对名人的选择是np困难的，并假设广告平台将采用IMP中广泛使用的简单贪婪算法，在此假设下，我们研究了名人定价博弈的纯纳什均衡。特别地，我们证明了当只有两个或三个参与者时，均衡存在并且是唯一的，但当有四个或更多参与者时，均衡不保证存在。
While the influence maximization problem (IMP) which studies how to trigger a large cascade in Online Social Networks (OSNs) by properly selecting seed nodes has been extensively studied in the past decade, one important and practical issue on how these seed nodes or celebrities will get paid for promoting cascades is seldom addressed. In order to get selected by the advertising platform and to maximize his/her own utility, it is natural for each celebrity to determine his/her price of promoting cascades based on other celebrities' decisions and his/her power of influence. In this paper, we formulate the problem of determining prices by celebrities as a pricing game, with celebrities as players. We show that celebrity selection by the advertising platform is NP-hard, and assume that the advertising platform will adopt the simple greedy algorithm that is widely used in IMP. Under this assumption, we study the pure Nash equilibrium of the pricing game among celebrities. In particular, we prove that while equilibrium exists and is unique when there are only two or three players, the equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist in cases of four or more players.