MastDP: Matching Based Double Auction Mechanism for Spectrum Trading with Differential Privacy
MastDP: Matching Based Double Auction Mechanism for Spectrum Trading with Differential Privacy
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DOI:
10.1109/globecom38437.2019.9013917
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发表时间:
2019-12
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Feng Hu;Bing Chen;Jingyi Wang;Ming Li;P. Li;M. Pan
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文献类型:
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作者:
Feng Hu;Bing Chen;Jingyi Wang;Ming Li;P. Li;M. Pan
The auction mechanism is deemed to be an effective method to address the problem of spectrum scarcity. Numerous spectrum auction mechanisms can alleviate spectrum shortage under the consideration of truthfulness, social welfare maximization and spectrum reusability, while the privacy preservation and preferences of primary/secondary users have not been fully discussed. In this paper, we propose a matching based double auction mechanism for spectrum trading with differential privacy (MastDP) to protect the privacy of buyers/sellers from the untrustworthy auctioneer, other buyers/sellers and other potential parties. Each participant adds distributed differential private noise following Geom(α) distribution to his bid value and encrypts the noisy bid value. The auctioneer can decrypt only the sum of all uploaded noisy bid values and determines the clearing price by using its private key. Based on the clearing price, the matching theory is adopted to maximize the winning participants' revenue while fully considering their preferences and spectrum reuse. Simulation results show that MastDP achieves satisfactory performance in terms of economic properties' privacy preservation and spectrum trading efficiency.