Channeled Attention and Stable Errors

Channeled Attention and Stable Errors
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发表时间:
2018-05
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通讯作者:
Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch;M. Rabin;Joshua Schwartzstein
Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch;M. Rabin;Joshua Schwartzstein
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作者:
Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch;M. Rabin;Joshua Schwartzstein

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我们开发了一个框架,用于评估一个人何时会注意到她对世界的理论是错误的,基于人们忽视他们认为(通过他们的误解的透镜)无关紧要的信息的想法。当一个错误的理论可以长期坚持,即使注意力是非常便宜的问题,我们研究的注意力稳定性的一般心理偏见,如天真的关于目前的偏见或忽视冗余的社会信息和上下文特定的经验错误的概念,如错误的信念有关药物的副作用或金融投资。只有当他们认为相关的数据使他们偶然注意到他们的理论是错误的时,人们才发现他们的错误。我们将探索哪些错误和环境的组合允许错误持续存在。当人们对哪些因素重要的判断是正确的,即使他们对这些因素如何重要的判断是错误的,人们也会在特定的环境中注意到代价高昂的错误,而导致人们普遍认为后果性因素无关紧要的错误在广泛的环境中是稳定的。人为地使这些因素密切相关的环境可能会导致错误的识别。电子邮件:gagnonbartsch@fas.harvard.edu,matthewrabin@fas.harvard.edu和jschwartzstein@hbs.edu。我们感谢刘畅出色的研究协助。对于有用的意见,我们感谢纳瓦·阿什拉夫,弗朗切斯卡·巴斯蒂耶罗,马克斯·巴泽曼,凯瑟琳·科夫曼,克莉丝汀·埃克斯利,埃里克·伊斯特,德鲁·富登伯格,尼古拉·Gennaioli,布赖恩·霍尔,大卫·赫什莱弗,博通德·凯泽吉,斯宾塞·权,乔治·洛温斯坦,迈克尔·卢卡,凯瑟琳·麦金,森迪尔·穆莱纳坦,安德烈·施莱弗,德米特里·陶宾斯基和BEAM,伯克利,波士顿学院,布兰代斯,CEU,康奈尔大学,达特茅斯学院的研讨会参与者,ESSET、哈佛、LSE、麦吉尔、墨尔本、普林斯顿、斯坦福大学、新南威尔士大学、悉尼科技大学和耶鲁大学。Gagnon-Bartsch和Rabin感谢挪威经济学院(NHH)的公平、不平等和合理性实验研究中心(FAIR)在进行本文研究时提供的财政支持和款待。“我的经验是我同意参加的。只有那些我注意到的事物塑造了我的思想;没有选择性的兴趣,经验是一片混乱。... [注意力]意味着从一些事情中撤退,以便有效地处理其他事情。- 威廉·詹姆斯:“明智的艺术就是知道该忽略什么的艺术。- 威廉·詹姆斯:“没有一种理论是对我们仁慈的,它欺骗了我们的观察。- 亨利詹姆斯“除了意外,真的没有什么可以期待的。”- 爱丽丝·詹姆斯
We develop a framework for assessing when a person will notice that a theory she has about the world is wrong, premised on the idea that people neglect information that they view (through the lens of their misconceptions) to be irrelevant. Focusing on the question of when a mistaken theory can persist in the long run even when attention is very cheap, we study the attentional stability of both general psychological biases—such as naivete about present bias or neglecting the redundancy in social information—and context-specific empirical misconceptions—such as false beliefs about medicinal side effects or financial investments. People discover their errors only when the data they deem relevant causes them to incidentally notice that their theory is wrong. We explore which combinations of errors and environments allow an error to persist. People tend to notice costly errors in a particular context when they are right about which factors matter even when they are wrong about how these factors matter, whereas errors that lead people to ubiquitously treat consequential factors as irrelevant will be stable across a broad class of environments. Environments designed to make such factors artificially germane can induce recognition of an error. ∗E-mails: gagnonbartsch@fas.harvard.edu, matthewrabin@fas.harvard.edu, and jschwartzstein@hbs.edu. We thank Chang Liu for excellent research assistance. For helpful comments, we are grateful to Nava Ashraf, Francesca Bastianello, Max Bazerman, Katherine Coffman, Christine Exley, Erik Eyster, Drew Fudenberg, Nicola Gennaioli, Brian Hall, David Hirshleifer, Botond Kőszegi, Spencer Kwon, George Loewenstein, Michael Luca, Kathleen McGinn, Sendhil Mullainathan, Andrei Shleifer, Dmitry Taubinsky and seminar participants at BEAM, Berkeley, Boston College, Brandeis, CEU, Cornell, Dartmouth, ESSET, Harvard, LSE, McGill, Melbourne, Princeton, Stanford, University of New South Wales, University of Technology Sydney, and Yale. Gagnon-Bartsch and Rabin thank the Centre for Experimental Research on Fairness, Inequality and Rationality (FAIR) at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), for financial support and hospitality while conducting research on this paper. “My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I notice shape my mind; without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos. ... [Attention] implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others.” – William James “The art of being wise is the art of knowing what to overlook.” – William James “No theory is kind to us that cheats us of seeing.” – Henry James “Truly nothing is to be expected except for the unexpected.” – Alice James