Determinants of Tariff Dependence in Agricultural Protection in Developed Countries: An Empirical Analysis using Panel Data
Determinants of Tariff Dependence in Agricultural Protection in Developed Countries: An Empirical Analysis using Panel Data
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发达国家农业保护关税依赖的决定因素：利用面板数据的实证分析
DOI：
10.2457/srs.40.679
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发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Takumi Sakuyama
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Takumi Sakuyama
农业部门可以通过关税或补贴得到保护。大多数发达国家已经从关税转向补贴，这被认为是更经济有效的，但日本仍然广泛依赖关税来保护农业。因此，作为经济福利的最佳政策组合，取消关税和通过一次性补贴进行补偿相结合的正统贸易理论的主张与日本的实际追求之间存在着巨大的差距。尽管有这样的差距，现有的文献对农业保护的政治经济主要集中在保护的“水平”，很少涉及的“选择”的工具，无论是关税或补贴。在此背景下，本文利用OECD 10国的面板数据，通过回归分析，探讨了农业保护中关税依赖的决定因素，并分析了日本继续以关税作为农业保护手段的原因。解释关税优于补贴的假设有三个方面：（i）"收入动机假说"，强调政府的预算限制或关税的较低征收成本，（ii）"不完全信息假说"，认为纳税人低估了关税的社会成本，高估了补贴的社会成本，（iii）"集体行动假设"，重点是关税的集体利益性质，导致利益集团之间搭便车，游说竞争减少，福利损失减少。它们的有效性是基于由OLS估计的单个方程中的系数的统计显著性来验证的，其中因变量是关税依赖率（关税保护在总农业保护中的份额）。自变量包括：（i）政府债务比率和所得税抚养比率作为收入动机假设的代理变量，（ii）高等教育获得率和报纸订阅率作为不完全信息假设的代理变量，（iii）议会选举投票率和主导农产品集中率作为集体行动假设的代理变量，及（iv）贸易依存率及兑美元汇率作为控制变数。回归分析表明，政府负债率和高等教育达标率的相关系数均达到统计学显著水平，且具有预期的特征，验证了收入动机假设和不完全信息假设。然而，集体行动假说没有得到支持。贸易抚养比作为控制变量也与预期符号具有统计显著性。根据这些具有统计学意义的解释变量，对各国的增长核算进行分析，可以看出，日本的关税依存度一直很高，这主要是因为政府负债率上升。这一结果表明，由于预算赤字的大幅增加，日本的农业保护难以从消费者负担的关税向纳税人负担的补贴转变。因此，如果日本要从关税保护转向补贴保护，就必须确保稳定的收入来源，用于对生产者的补偿性补贴，而不依赖关税收入。JEL分类：F13，H29，Q17，Q18
The agricultural sector can be protected either by tariffs or subsidies. Most developed countries have moved away from tariffs to subsidies, which are supposed to be more economically efficient, but Japan remains extensively reliant on tariffs for agricultural protection. As such, there is a large gap between what is prescribed by the orthodox trade theory, which suggests a combination of tariff elimination and compensation through lump-sum subsidies as the best policy mix for economic welfare, and what is actually pursued by Japan. Despite such a gap, existing literature on the political-economy of agricultural protection has mainly focused on the ‘level' of protection and rarely addresses the ‘choice' of instruments either tariffs or subsidies. Against this background, this article explores the determinants of tariff dependence in agricultural protection through a regression analysis using panel data for 10 OECD countries to identify the reasons why Japan continues to reply on tariffs as a means of agricultural protection. Hypotheses explaining the preference for tariffs over subsidies to be verified are threefold: (i) ‘revenue motive hypothesis' emphasising the budgetary constraints by governments or lower collection costs of tariffs, (ii) ‘incomplete information hypothesis' arguing that taxpayers understate social costs of tariffs and overstate those of subsidies, (iii) ‘collective action hypothesis' focusing on the collective good nature of tariffs that lead to free-riding among interests groups, lower lobby competition and smaller welfare losses. Their validity is verified based on the statistical significance of coefficients in a single equation estimated by the OLS, with the dependent variable being tariff-dependency ratio (share of tariff protection in total agricultural protection). Independent variables include (i) government debt ratio and income tax dependency ratio as proxies for revenue motive hypothesis, (ii) tertiary attainment ratio and newspaper subscription ratio as proxies for incomplete information hypothesis, (iii) voter turnout in parliamentary elections and concentration ratio of dominant agricultural commodities as proxies for collective action hypothesis, and (iv) trade dependency ratio and exchange rates against US dollar as control variables. The regression analysis reveals that the revenue motive and incomplete information hypotheses are validated given that the coefficients of government debt ratio and tertiary attainment ratio are statistically significant with the expected signs. However, the collective action hypothesis is not supported. Trade dependency ratio as a control variable is also statistically significant with the expected sign. A growth accounting analysis of individual countries based on these statistically significant explanatory variables shows that Japan's consistently high tariff dependence is largely explained by increased government debt ratio. This result implies that Japan's salient increase in budget deficit makes it difficult to transform its agricultural protection from consumer-borne tariffs to taxpayer-financed subsidies due to budgetary constraints. Consequently, it will be indispensable to secure stable revenue sources to be devoted to compensatory subsidies for producers without relying on tariff revenues if Japan is to move away from tariff to subsidy protection.JEL Classification: F13, H29, Q17, Q18