Patent Races for COVID-19 Vaccines and Liability Rules
Patent Races for COVID-19 Vaccines and Liability Rules
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DOI：
10.1515/ajle-2020-0042
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发表时间：
2020-10
影响因子：
0.7
通讯作者：
Jeong‐Yoo Kim
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jeong‐Yoo Kim
摘要分析了新冠肺炎疫苗在替代责任规则下的专利竞争模型。疫苗的第一个发明者获得垄断租金，但必须承担其副作用的全部责任。在这个模型中，公司选择两种投资，一种是为了发明疫苗，另一种是为了疫苗的安全性。我表明，在严格责任的情况下，公司有过度投资这两项活动的动机。这与确定的结果形成对比，即在严格责任下，加害者采取了社会最优的事故预防措施。这种对比来自于竞争效应。由于竞争而在疫苗发明上过度投资，也会使一家公司在安全性上过度投资。我还认为，公司获得全部或部分责任豁免是不可取的，因为这将降低投资安全的动机。相反，通过调节疫苗价格来降低垄断租金可以解决这两个过度投资问题。
Abstract I analyze a model of patent races for COVID-19 vaccines under alternative liability rules. The first inventor of the vaccine gets the monopoly rent, but must assume full liability from its side effects. In this model, firms choose two kinds of investments, one for inventing a vaccine and the other for its safety. I show that firms have an incentive to overinvest in both activities under strict liability. This is contrasted with the established result established that the injurer takes socially optimal accident-preventing precaution under strict liability. This contrast comes from the competition effect. Overinvestment in inventing vaccines due to competition makes a firm overinvest in safety as well. I also argue that it is undesirable for firms to get full or partial exemption from liability, because it would reduce the incentive to invest in safety. Instead, reducing the monopoly rent by regulating the vaccine price resolves both overinvestment problems.