Response to McDowell
Response to McDowell
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对麦克道尔的回应
DOI：
10.1080/00201740701489401
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
H. Dreyfus
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Dreyfus
我们的辩论以一个尴尬但充满希望的开端开始，我假设概念必须是一般性的，并批评了我认为麦克道尔的唯心主义观点，基于海德格尔的主张，即幻影是对具体的情况做出反应，而不是对一般情况做出反应。对此，麦克道尔指出，在他的观点中，概念性是特定于情景的--这一观点可能是他通过查尔斯·泰勒和汉斯-乔治·伽达默尔间接从海德格尔那里获得的。看起来我们有很多共同点，但现在我认为，尽管实际上我们有共同点，但我们的分歧仍然很大。例如，海德格尔认为，我们在处理发生故障的设备时，会根据具体情况使用概念--例如，当我们注意到这把锤子对这项工作来说太重时，即我们注意到它太重了。但海德格尔指出，我们的大多数活动根本不涉及概念。也就是说，他们没有特定情况下的“AS结构”。事实上，在我们的日常应对中，也就是他所说的“全力以赴”，我们既不会处理具有体重等一般属性的物体，也不会处理特定情况下的问题，比如太重。相反，当一切进展顺利，我们全神贯注于应对，我们使用的设备
Our debate got off to an embarrassing yet hopeful start with me assuming that concepts must be general and criticizing what I took to be McDowell’s conceptualist account of phronesis on the basis of Heidegger’s claim that the phronemos is responsive to the concrete, not the general, situation. In response, McDowell pointed out that on his view conceptuality is situationspecific—a view that he may have acquired indirectly from Heidegger by way of Charles Taylor and Hans-Georg Gadamer. It looked like we had a lot in common, but now I think that, while in fact we do, our differences are still significant. For example, Heidegger holds that we use concepts in a situation-specific way when dealing with malfunctioning equipment—when, for example, we notice that this hammer is too heavy for this job, i.e. we notice it as too heavy. But Heidegger points out that most of our activities don’t involve concepts at all. That is, they don’t have a situation-specific ‘‘as structure’’. Indeed, in our everyday coping, which he calls ‘‘pressing into possibilities’’, we don’t deal with objects with general properties like weight, nor with situation-specific aspects like too heavy. Rather, when everything is going well and we are absorbed in our coping, the equipment we are using