RESTRICTIVE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED-STATES
RESTRICTIVE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED-STATES
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DOI：
10.2307/1964130
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发表时间：
1992-09-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
HUBER, JD
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
HUBER, JD
我开发了一个框架，适用于现有的正式模式，在国会的限制性修改程序的研究，法国政府的使用两个限制性的立法程序，一揽子表决和“断头台”。我测试六个假设来自现有的正式模型和现有的研究法国国民议会。分析表明，法国政府援引这两个程序对同一类型的分配和管辖权复杂的法案，经常收到封闭的规则在国会。分析还表明，使用限制性程序的决定与政府的多数地位密切相关，这表明它们被用来维护政党之间的协议，就像限制性修正程序被用来维护国会个别成员之间的协议一样。因此，现有的正式模式的立法机构可以帮助我们研究程序结构如何塑造政党之间的战略谈判在议会制度，特别是在联合政府和少数政府。
I develop a framework for applying existing formal models of restrictive amendment procedures in Congress to the study of the French government's use of two restrictive legislative procedures, the package vote and the "guillotine". I test six hypotheses derived from existing formal models and from existing research on the French National Assembly. The analysis shows that the French government invokes the two procedures on the same types of distributive and jurisdictionally complex bills that frequently receive closed rules in Congress. The analysis also shows that the decision to use the restrictive procedures is strongly linked to the majority status of the government, suggesting they are used to preserve agreements between parties in the same way that restrictive amendment procedures are used to preserve agreements between individual members of Congress. Thus, existing formal models of legislative institutions can help us study how procedural structures shape strategic bargaining between political parties in parliamentary systems, especially during coalition and minority government.