Bank Loan Commitment Contracts: Data, Theory, and Tests
Bank Loan Commitment Contracts: Data, Theory, and Tests
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银行贷款承诺合同：数据、理论和测试
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.8409
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Thakor
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Richard L. Shockley;A. Thakor
在美国，超过80%的商业银行对企业的贷款是通过银行贷款承诺完成的。然而，作者对贷款承诺合同的经验知识知之甚少。在这篇文章中，他们描述了银行贷款承诺的丰富合同结构，这些合同基于与2500多份合同有关的数据。然后，作者建立了一个模型，证明了当银行面临借款人逆向选择和道德风险问题时，观察到的银行贷款承诺合同的复杂结构(通常包括多个费用结构、借款人特定的合同变量和标准的“重大不利变化条款”)是重要的。最后，作者通过用数据来验证他们的模型的稳健性。俄亥俄州立大学出版社版权所有1997年。
Over 80 per cent of all commercial bank lending to corporations in the U.S. is done via bank loan commitments. Yet the authors have little empirical knowledge of loan commitment contracts. In this paper they describe the rich contractual structure of bank loan commitments based on data pertaining to over 2,500 contracts. The authors then develop a model which demonstrates that the observed complex structure of bank loan commitment contracts (which typically include multiple fee structures borrower-specific contracting variables, and the standard 'material adverse change clause') is important when the bank faces borrower adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Finally, the authors verify the robustness of their model by confronting its additional testable predictions with the data. Copyright 1997 by Ohio State University Press.