Strategic trade policies with first-mover and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure
Strategic trade policies with first-mover and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure
复制标题
具有纵向结构先发优势和后发优势的战略性贸易政策
DOI：
10.1080/09638199.2016.1262892
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Lim Seonyoung
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Choi Kangsik;Lee DongJoon;Lim Seonyoung
在战略贸易政策中，我们考虑了垂直结构中的先发和后发优势，给定了上游企业的两部分关税合同(由投入价格和固定费用组成)，其中本国和外国最终产品公司向第三国市场出口。我们发现，上游企业和政府对顺序博弈和同时博弈的偏好，以及相对于自由贸易和补贴制度的偏好，与战略贸易政策的早期结果形成了鲜明对比。因此，内生的市场结构是：(I)潜在领导者选择数量策略的领导者角色，均衡贸易制度是单边补贴，而不考虑商品的性质；(Ii)在价格策略下，潜在领导者选择同步时机，均衡贸易制度是双边税收(自由贸易)，商品是替代(补充)。
With strategic trade policies, we consider first- and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure given the two-part tariff contract (composed of the input price and the fixed fee) of an upstream firm, where a home and a foreign final-good firms export to a third-country market. We find that the upstream firms’ and governments’ preference orderings over sequential versus simultaneous play and over free trade versus a regime of subsidies contrast with early results in the strategic trade policy. Thus, the endogenous market structure is that (i) the potential leader chooses the Leader role with quantity strategies, and the equilibrium trade regime is unilateral subsidy regardless of the nature of goods; (ii) with price strategies, the potential leader chooses the simultaneous timing, and the equilibrium trade regime is bilateral taxes (free trade) when goods are substitutes (complements).