The Real First Class? Inferring Confidential Corporate Mergers and Government Relations from Air Traffic Communication
The Real First Class? Inferring Confidential Corporate Mergers and Government Relations from Air Traffic Communication
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真正的头等舱？
DOI：
10.1109/eurosp.2018.00016
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
I. Martinovic
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Martin Strohmeier;Matthew Smith;Vincent Lenders;I. Martinovic
本文利用公开的飞机Meta数据，结合从全球协作传感器网络收集的未经过滤的空中交通通信，研究大规模飞机跟踪对政府和公共企业的隐私影响。首先，我们使用113个不同政府使用的542架经过验证的飞机的运动数据来识别真实的世界中的事件和关系。我们开发了一个时空聚类方法，返回47个公共和18个非公共会议参加了专门的政府飞机在18个月的过程中。此外，我们通过外国政府访问欧洲的例子说明了分析航空用户的长期行为和关系的容易性。其次，我们利用相同类型的数据来预测潜在的并购（M&A）活动的36家公司在美国和欧洲的股票市场上市。我们确定了7个并购案例，在所有这些案例中，买家都在正式宣布之前使用公务机访问了目标，平均提前61天。最后，我们分析了五个现有的技术和非技术缓解方案，可供个别利益相关者。我们量化了它们的受欢迎程度和有效性，发现尽管它们目前被广泛使用，但它们对所提出的漏洞利用是无效的。因此，我们认为，需要进行监管和技术变革，以便能够在未来保护非商业航空用户的隐私。
This paper exploits publicly available aircraft meta data in conjunction with unfiltered air traffic communication gathered from a global collaborative sensor network to study the privacy impact of large-scale aircraft tracking on governments and public corporations. First, we use movement data of 542 verified aircraft used by 113 different governments to identify events and relationships in the real world. We develop a spatio-temporal clustering method which returns 47 public and 18 non-public meetings attended by dedicated government aircraft over the course of 18 months. Additionally, we illustrate the ease of analyzing the long-term behavior and relationships of aviation users through the example of foreign governments visiting Europe. Secondly, we exploit the same types of data to predict potential merger and acquisition (M&A) activities by 36 corporations listed on the US and European stock markets. We identify seven M&A cases, in all of which the buyer has used corporate aircraft to visit the target prior to the official announcement, on average 61 days before. Finally, we analyze five existing technical and non-technical mitigation options available to the individual stakeholders. We quantify their popularity and effectiveness, finding that despite their current widespread use, they are ineffective against the presented exploits. Consequently, we argue that regulatory and technical changes are required to be able to protect the privacy of non-commercial aviation users in the future.