Experienced vs. Described Uncertainty: Do We Need Two Prospect Theory Specifications?
Experienced vs. Described Uncertainty: Do We Need Two Prospect Theory Specifications?
复制标题
DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.1110.1368
复制
发表时间：
2011-10-01
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Paraschiv, Corina
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Abdellaoui, Mohammed;L'Haridon, Olivier;Paraschiv, Corina
本文报告了在两种决策环境下，所有前景理论组成部分（即效用、损失厌恶和加权函数）的个体层面上的实验启发结果：备选方案被描述为概率分布的情况，以及决策者在选择前必须通过抽样经历未知概率分布的情况。对于基于描述的决策，我们的结果与前景理论在风险下的实证结果完全一致。此外，在效用和损失厌恶方面，在不同的语境中没有发现显著的差异。尽管在前景理论中，决策权重在不同的背景下表现出类似的定性性质，但我们的数据表明，至少对于收益而言，基于经验和基于描述的决策中对不确定性的主观处理是显著不同的。更具体地说，我们观察到在基于经验的决策中，小概率的权重不太明显，而中等和高概率的权重则更明显。相反，对于损失，在不同背景下的前景评估中没有观察到显著差异。
This paper reports on the results of an experimental elicitation at the individual level of all prospect theory components (i.e., utility, loss aversion, and weighting functions) in two decision contexts: situations where alternatives are described as probability distributions and situations where the decision maker must experience unknown probability distributions through sampling before choice. For description-based decisions, our results are fully consistent with prospect theory's empirical findings under risk. Furthermore, no significant differences are detected across contexts as regards utility and loss aversion. Whereas decision weights exhibit similar qualitative properties across contexts typically found under prospect theory, our data suggest that, for gains at least, the subjective treatment of uncertainty in experience-based and description-based decisions is significantly different. More specifically, we observe a less pronounced overweighting of small probabilities and a more pronounced underweighting of moderate and high probabilities for experience-based decisions. On the contrary, for losses, no significant differences were observed in the evaluation of prospects across contexts.