Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games with Multiple Populations
Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games with Multiple Populations
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发表时间：
2009
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通讯作者：
Toshimasa Maruta;Akira Okada
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作者：
Toshimasa Maruta;Akira Okada
我们研究了n人二元协调博弈中的均衡选择问题，通过自适应错误游戏（Young 1993）。的大小和深度的一个特定类型的盆地的吸引力被认为是决定选择结果的主要因素。主要结果表明，如果一个策略具有较大的吸引域，且吸引域足够深，则该策略构成随机稳定均衡。具有多个随机稳定均衡的博弈的存在是该结果的直接结果。我们明确地解决了多维随机演化模型和一维模型中的选择结果之间的质的差异，并阐明了差异的来源。
We investigate the equilibrium selection problem in n-person binary coordination games by means of adaptive play with mistakes (Young 1993). The size and the depth of a particular type of basins of attraction are found to be the main factors in determining the selection outcome. The main result shows that if a strategy has the larger basin of attraction, and if it is deep enough, then the strategy constitutes a stochastically stable equilibrium. The existence of games with multiple stochastically stable equilibria is an immediate consequence of the result. We explicitly address the qualitative difference between selection results in multi-dimensional stochastic evolution models and those in single dimensional models, and shed some light on the source of the difference.