Political Competition: Theory and Applications
Political Competition: Theory and Applications
复制标题
政治竞争：理论与应用
DOI：
10.5860/choice.39-3073
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Roemer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Roemer
导言1.政治竞争在一个单一的问题：案例的公民，选民和政党1.2唐斯模型1.3惠特曼模型1.4结论2。建模党的不确定性2.1介绍2.2的状态空间方法的不确定性2.3误差分布模型的不确定性2.4一个martite型模型2.5结论3.不确定性的一维政策空间3.1引言3.2唐斯模型3.3惠特曼模型：一个例子3.4惠特曼均衡的存在3.5惠特曼均衡的性质3.6总结4.维特曼模型的应用4.1再分配的简单模型：极端主义的政治4.2具有供给弹性的政治经济均衡4.3党派教条主义和政治极端主义4.4政治周期的动态模型4.5结论5.内生方：一维情况5.1介绍5.2平均成员纳什均衡5.3孔多赛特纳什均衡5.4结论6.在几个问题上的政治竞争：6.1引言6.2唐斯模型6.3惠特曼模型6.4结论7.多维问题空间和不确定性：唐斯模型7.1介绍7.2不确定性的状态空间和误差分布模型7.3 Coughlin模型7.4 Lindbeck-Weibull模型7.5将Coughlin模型适应于总体不确定性的情况7.6结论8.党派和纳什均衡8.1介绍8.2党派8.3 PUNE作为一个讨价还价的均衡8.4 PUNE的微分特征8.5经常惠特曼均衡8.6 PUNE在一维模型8.7 PUNE在多维欧几里德模型8.8结论9. 9.1介绍9.2模型9.3均衡概念9.4政党竞争分析9.5校准9.6结论10.为什么穷人不剥夺富人在民主国家10.1历史问题和模型预览10.2政治经济环境10.3 PUNE分析10.4实证检验10.5定理证明10.6结论性意见11.分配阶级政治和两次世界大战之间欧洲的政治地理11.1引言11.2吕伯特模型11.3吕伯特理论的检验11.4介绍共产党人：一个三方模型11.5结论11.6方法论尾声附录11 A 12.美国政治的三级模型12.1介绍12.2模型12.3 PUNE的特征12.4结果12.5结论13.多维竞争的内生政党13.1引言13.2内生政党13.3税收和种族13.4根据美国数据拟合模型13.5二次税收13.6政党的私人融资13.7关于PUNE存在的技术性评论13.8结论13.9为什么穷人不剥夺富人：重复14. 14.1联合政府的模型14.2惠特曼政党的支付函数14.3联合政府的一个例子：一维的惠特曼均衡14.4多维的三党政治14.5多维议题空间的联合政府例14.6结论数学附录A.1概率论基础A.2来自分析的一些概念参考文献索引
Preface Introduction 1. Political Competition over a Single Issue: The Case of Certainty 1.1 Citizens, Voters, and Parties 1.2 The Downs Model 1.3 The Wittman Model 1.4 Conclusion 2. Modeling Party Uncertainty 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The State-Space Approach to Uncertainty 2.3 An Error-Distribution Model of Uncertainty 2.4 A Finite-Type Model 2.5 Conclusion 3. Unidimensional Policy Spaces with Uncertainty 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The Downs Model 3.3 The Wittman Model: An Example 3.4 Existence of Wittman Equilibrium 3.5 Properties of Wittman Equilibrium 3.6 Summary 4. Applications of the Wittman Model 4.1 Simple Models of Redistribution: The Politics of Extremism 4.2 Politico-Economic Equilibrium with Labor-Supply Elasticity 4.3 Partisan Dogmatism and Political Extremism 4.4 A Dynamic Model of Political Cycles 4.5 Conclusion 5. Endogenous Parties: The Unidimensional Case 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Average-Member Nash Equilibrium 5.3 Condorcet-Nash Equilibrium 5.4 Conclusion 6. Political Competition over Several Issues: The Case of Certainty 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The Downs Model 6.3 The Wittman Model 6.4 Conclusion 7. Multidimensional Issue Spaces and Uncertainty: The Downs Model 7.1 Introduction 7.2 The State-Space and Error-Distribution Models of Uncertainty 7.3 The Coughlin Model 7.4 The Lindbeck-Weibull Model 7.5 Adapting the Coughlin Model to the Case of Aggregate Uncertainty 7.6 Conclusion 8. Party Factions and Nash Equilibrium 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Party Factions 8.3 PUNE as a Bargaining Equilibrium 8.4 A Differential Characterization of PUNE 8.5 Regular Wittman Equilibrium 8.6 PUNEs in the Unidimensional Model 8.7 PUNEs in a Multidimensional Euclidean Model 8.8 Conclusion 9. The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Taxation 9.1 Introduction 9.2 The Model 9.3 The Equilibrium Concepts 9.4 Analysis of Party Competition 9.5 Calibration 9.6 Conclusion 10. Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich in Democracies 10.1 The Historical Issue and a Model Preview 10.2 The Politico-Economic Environment 10.3 Analysis of PUNEs 10.4 Empirical Tests 10.5 Proofs of Theorems 10.6 Concluding Remark 11. Distributive Class Politics and the Political Geography of Interwar Europe 11.1 Introduction 11.2 The Luebbert Model 11.3 Testing Luebbert's Theory 11.4 Introducing the Communists: A Three-Party Model 11.5 Conclusion 11.6 Methodological Coda Appendix 11A 12. A Three-Class Model of American Politics 12.1 Introduction 12.2 The Model 12.3 Characterization of PUNEs 12.4 Results 12.5 Conclusion 13. Endogenous Parties with Multidimensional Competition 13.1 Introduction 13.2 Endogenous Parties 13.3 Taxation and Race 13.4 Fitting the Model to U.S. Data 13.5 Quadratic Taxation 13.6 Private Financing of Parties 13.7 A Technical Remark on the Existence of PUNEs 13.8 Conclusion 13.9 Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich: Reprise 14. Toward a Model of Coalition Government 14.1 Introduction 14.2 The Payoff Function of a Wittman Party 14.3 An Example of Coalition Government: Unidimensional Wittman Equilibrium 14.4 Multidimensional Three-Party Politics 14.5 Coalition Government with a Multidimensional Issue Space: An Example 14.6 Conclusion Mathematical Appendix A.1 Basics of Probability Theory A.2 Some Concepts from Analysis References Index