Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy
Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy
复制标题
近视选民与自然灾害政策
DOI：
10.1017/s0003055409990104
复制
发表时间：
2009-08-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Malhotra, Neil
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Healy, Andrew;Malhotra, Neil
选民是否有效地要求当选官员对政策决定负责？使用自然灾害，政府支出和选举回报的数据，我们表明，选民奖励现任总统党提供救灾支出，但不是投资于备灾支出。这些不一致扭曲了公职人员的激励，导致政府在备灾方面投资不足，从而造成巨大的公共福利损失。我们估计，在准备工作上花费的1美元在减轻未来损失方面价值约15美元。通过估计政策决定的决定因素和这些政策的后果，我们提供了关于公民能力和政府责任的更完整的证据
Do voters effectively hold elected officials accountable for policy decisions? Using data on natural disasters, government spending, and election returns, we show that voters reward the incumbent presidential party for delivering disaster relief spending, but not for investing in disaster preparedness spending. These inconsistencies distort the incentives of public officials, leading the government to underinvest in disaster preparedness, thereby causing substantial public welfare losses. We estimate that $1 spent on preparedness is worth about $15 in terms of the future damage it mitigates. By estimating both the determinants of policy decisions and the consequences of those policies, we provide more complete evidence about citizen competence and government accountability