Organizational Forms Within the Insurance Industry: Theory and Evidence
Organizational Forms Within the Insurance Industry: Theory and Evidence
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保险业内的组织形式：理论与证据
DOI：
10.1007/978-94-010-0642-2_21
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Clifford W. Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Mayers;Clifford W. Smith
保险业的组织形式包括股份公司、互助公司、互惠公司和劳合社。我们关注组织形式的选择与企业承包成本之间的关联，认为不同的组织形式在特定维度上降低了承包成本。这表明，保险公司各方之间控制特定激励冲突的不同成本导致了跨保险业务的替代组织形式的效率。我们分析了保险公司内执行三大职能（执行职能、所有者职能和客户职能）的个人的激励。我们回顾了保险业直接检验产品专业化假设的证据。然后，我们通过替代组织形式检查公司政策选择的证据：高管薪酬政策、董事会组成、分配系统选择、再保险购买和分红保单的使用。最后，我们回顾了替代组织形式相对效率的证据。
Organizational forms within the insurance industry include stock companies, mutuals, reciprocals, and Lloyds. We focus on the association between the choice of organizational form and the firm’s contracting costs, arguing that different organizational forms reduce contracting costs in specific dimensions. This suggests that differing costs of controlling particular incentive conflicts among the parties of the insurance firm lead to the efficiency of alternative organizational forms across lines of insurance. We analyze the incentives of individuals performing the three major functions within the insurance firm—the executive function, the owner function, and the customer function. We review evidence from the insurance industry that directly examines the product-specialization hypothesis. We then examine evidence on corporate policy choices by the alternative organizational forms: executive compensation policy, board composition, distribution system choice, reinsurance purchases, and the use of participating policies. Finally, we review evidence of the relative efficiency of the alternative organizational forms.