Socially-Optimal Locations of Duopoly Firms with Non-Uniform Consumer Densities
Socially-Optimal Locations of Duopoly Firms with Non-Uniform Consumer Densities
复制标题
消费者密度不均匀的双头垄断企业的社会最优位置
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Taojun Xie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kieron J. Meagher;Ernie G. S. Teo;Taojun Xie
理论文献的进展
Advances in the theoretical literature have
extended the Hotelling model of spatial competition from a uniform distribution
of consumers to the family of log-concave distributions. While a closed form
has been found for the equilibrium locations for symmetric log-concave
distributions, the literature contains no closed form solution for the socially
optimal locations. We provide a closed form solution for the socially optimal
locations: one mean-deviation away from the median. We also derive a formula
for the excess differentiation ratio which complements the bounds previously
derived in the literature, and establish the invariance of this ratio to a form
of mean preserving spread. The equilibrium duopoly locations of several types
of commonly used distributions were discussed in [1]. This paper provides the
closed form solutions for the socially optimal locations to the same set of
distributions. We calculate welfare improvements arising from regulation of
firm location and show how these vary with the distribution of consumers. While
regulating firm locations is sufficient to optimize welfare for symmetric
distributions, additional price regulation is required to ensure social
optimality for asymmetric distributions. These results are significant for
urban policy over firm/store locations.