Level Discrimination and FRAND Commitments Under EU Competition Law
Level Discrimination and FRAND Commitments Under EU Competition Law
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欧盟竞争法下的级别歧视和 FRAND 承诺
DOI：
10.54648/woco2017015
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
0.4
通讯作者：
Renato Nazzini
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Renato Nazzini
标准对我们的经济至关重要，竞争法在确保标准制定程序不被扭曲从而对技术进步和社会福利产生负面影响方面发挥着重要作用。本文考察了水平歧视的实践，当标准必要专利（SEP）的保持器持有人承诺以公平、合理和非歧视（FRAND）的条件许可SEP时，决定只许可供应链特定水平的企业，通常是最终产品制造商，而不是零部件制造商。等级歧视在实践中很重要，并在第102条的解释和适用中提出了新的问题。本文探讨了支持和反对等级歧视的经济和政策论据，并讨论了这种做法是否可能构成《欧盟运作条约》第102条规定的滥用支配地位，区分了执业和非执业实体的地位。
Standards are of fundamental importance in our economy and competition law has an important role to play in ensuring that standard setting procedures are not distorted so as to result in negative effects on technological progress and social welfare. This article examines the practice of level discrimination, which occurs when the holder of a standard essential patent (SEP), having made a commitment to license the SEP on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, decides to license only undertakings at a given level of the supply chain, typically, the end-product manufacturers, rather than the component manufacturers. Level discrimination is significant in practice and raises novel questions in the interpretation and application of Article 102. This article examines the economic and policy arguments for and against level discrimination and discusses whether the practice may amount to an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU, distinguishing the position of practising and non-practising entities.