Bare particulars
Bare particulars
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DOI：
10.1007/bf00396663
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发表时间：
1963
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Edwin B. Allaire
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Edwin B. Allaire
人们经常听到有关“细节匮乏”的抱怨。这个抱怨多年来一直困扰着我。我知道这也会让其他人烦恼，但似乎没有人在印刷品上发泄出来，所以这就是我打算做的。 （我也希望在此过程中说一些有建设性的话。）这种抱怨是针对基础理论的，该理论认为，特殊性在某种意义上与其普遍性是分离的。如果普遍性和特殊性是分开的，仅通过实例化关系相互联系，那么，据说，这些特殊性的本质就变得神秘了。就其本身而言，它们根本没有任何属性。它们只不过是一个可以戳入共性的针垫。它们是洛克的“我不知道什么”（1689，II，xxiii，§2）；它们是柏拉图的容器（《蒂迈欧篇》48c-53c）；它们是“纯粹的细节”。1 与底层理论相对立的是捆绑理论，根据该理论，细节只是共相的捆绑。基质理论和束理论有很多共识。他们一致认为普遍性和特殊性都存在。他们同意，某种意义上的特殊性具有普遍性。 （我在底层理论和束理论之间中立地使用诸如“特定的 P 具有普遍的 U ”和“特定的 P 的普遍性”之类的短语。）但是束理论认为，特殊性是由其普遍性彻底组成的（即，是其普遍性的分体融合）。另一方面，基础理论否认了这一点。采取一个特殊的方法，并分体地减去它的共性。还剩下什么吗？根据捆绑理论，不会。但根据底层理论，确实留下了一些东西。称此为“薄特殊”。薄弱的特殊性不包含共性作为部分；它实例化它们。
One often hears a complaint about “bare particulars”. This complaint has bugged me for years. I know it bugs others too, but no one seems to have vented in print, so that is what I propose to do. (I hope also to say a few constructive things along the way.) The complaint is aimed at the substratum theory, which says that particulars are, in a certain sense, separate from their universals. If universals and particulars are separate, connected to each other only by a relation of instantiation, then, it is said, the nature of these particulars becomes mysterious. In themselves, they do not have any properties at all. They are nothing but a pincushion into which universals may be poked. They are Locke’s “I know not what” (1689, II, xxiii, §2); they are Plato’s receptacles (Timaeus 48c–53c); they are “bare particulars”.1 Against substratum theory there is the bundle theory, according to which particulars are just bundles of universals. The substratum and bundle theories agree on much. They agree that both universals and particulars exist. And they agree that a particular in some sense has universals. (I use phrases like ‘particular P has universal U ’ and ‘particular P ’s universals’ neutrally as between the substratum and bundle theories.) But the bundle theory says that a particular is exhaustively composed of (i.e., is a mereological fusion of) its universals. The substratum theory, on the other hand, denies this. Take a particular, and mereologically subtract away its universals. Is anything left? According to the bundle theory, no. But according to the substratum theory, something is indeed left. Call this remaining something a thin particular. The thin particular does not contain the universals as parts; it instantiates them.