Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games
Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.49.6.831.16024
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发表时间：
2003-06
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Leech
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Leech
投票权指数可以分析立法机关或投票机构中的权力分配，其中不同成员拥有不同的票数。虽然这种以合作博弈论为基础的衡量权力的方法早已为人所知，但其实证应用在某种程度上受到限制，部分原因是当有许多参与者时难以计算指数。本文提出了计算Shapley和Shubik和Banzhaf的幂指数的新算法，这些算法基本上是对Owen的近似方法的修改，并已被证明在真实的应用中工作良好。他们是最实用的情况下，双方的球员数量是大的，他们的投票权重非常集中，一些成员有相当大的票数比其他人，欧文的近似方法是最不准确的。
Voting Power Indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting body in which different members have different numbers of votes. Although this approach to the measurement of power, based on co-operative game theory, has been known for a long time its empirical application has been to some extent limited, in part by the difficulty of computing the indices when there are many players. This paper presents new algorithms for computing the power indices of Shapley and Shubik and of Banzhaf, that are essentially modifications of approximation methods due to Owen, and have been shown to work well in real applications. They are of most utility in situations where both the number of players is large and their voting weights are very concentrated, some members having considerably larger numbers of votes than others, where Owen's approximation methods are least accurate.