Impossible possible worlds vindicated
Impossible possible worlds vindicated
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不可能的可能世界被证明是正确的
DOI：
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发表时间：
1975
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
J. Hintikka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Hintikka
人们经常声称，我自1962年以来一直倡导的对命题态度(如知识和信念)的可能两种RID分析是不切实际的，1如果不是完全错误的话，因为它显然使我们信奉逻辑无所不知的假设，即每个人都知道他所知道的所有逻辑后果的假设，对于所有其他命题态度也是如此。由于这种逻辑全知的假设显然是错误的，这种承诺似乎构成了对命题态度的整个可能世界处理的严重反对。
It has often been claimed that the by now familiar possible-two rids analysis of propositional attitudes like knowledge and belief which I have advocated since 1962 is unrealistic,1 if not downright mistaken, because it apparently commits us to the assumption of logical omniscience, that is, to the assumption that everyone knows all the logical consequences of what he knows, and analogously for all the other propositional attitudes. Since the assumption of such logical omniscience is obviously mistaken, this commitment seems to constitute a grave objection to the whole possible-worlds treatment of propositional attitudes.