An AES Smart Card Implementation Resistant to Power Analysis Attacks
An AES Smart Card Implementation Resistant to Power Analysis Attacks
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DOI：
10.1007/11767480_16
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发表时间：
2006-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Christoph Herbst;E. Oswald;S. Mangard
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Christoph Herbst;E. Oswald;S. Mangard
在本文中，我们描述了一种高效的AES软件实现，它非常适合8位智能卡，并能抵抗功率分析攻击。我们的实现掩盖了中间结果，并在AES执行的开始和结束时随机化了操作序列。由于屏蔽，它可以抵御简单的功率分析攻击、模板攻击和一阶DPA攻击。由于掩蔽和随机化的结合，它可以抵抗高阶DPA攻击。抵抗意味着成功的攻击需要大量的测量。这个预期的测量数是可调的。设计师可以选择随机化的数量，从而增加测量的数量。本文还包括对对策的实际评价。结果证明了对策理论评价的正确性。
In this article we describe an efficient AES software implementation that is well suited for 8-bit smart cards and resistant against power analysis attacks. Our implementation masks the intermediate results and randomizes the sequence of operations at the beginning and the end of the AES execution. Because of the masking, it is secure against simple power analysis attacks, template attacks and first-order DPA attacks. Due to the combination of masking and randomization, it is resistant against higher-order DPA attacks. Resistant means that a large number of measurements is required for a successful attack. This expected number of measurements is tunable. The designer can choose the amount of randomization and thereby increase the number of measurements. This article also includes a practical evaluation of the countermeasures. The results prove the theoretical assessment of the countermeasures to be correct.