Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
复制标题
合同匹配的等价定理
DOI：
10.1007/s10058-021-00257-4
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发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
0.7
通讯作者：
Yusuke Iwase
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Inagaki Takuya;Taniguchi Satoshi;Kawai Yasuhiro;Maeki Takahiro;Nakayama Eri;Tajima Shigeru;Takeyama Haruko;Lim Chang Kweng;Saijo Masayuki;Yusuke Iwase
本研究考虑了契约匹配模型（如医生-医院匹配）中医生-最优稳定机制。我们证明，只要存在医生-最优稳定机制，当且仅当该机制是有效的当且仅当该机制是马斯金单调的，且均来自医生方面。此外，考虑替代品和总需求规律，我们发现当且仅当该机制是有效的，该机制是一致的。
This study considers the doctor-optimal stable mechanism in a matching-with-contract model (a doctor-hospital match, for instance). We show that, whenever the doctor-optimal stable mechanism exists, the mechanism is group strategy-proof if and only if it is efficient if and only if it is Maskin monotonic, all from the doctors’ side. Moreover, with substitutes and the law of aggregate demand, we find that the mechanism is consistent if and only if it is efficient.