Downward Causation Defended
Downward Causation Defended
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向下因果关系辩护
DOI：
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Woodward
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Woodward
本文对向下因果关系的概念进行了辩护。我将试图阐明这一概念，解释为什么它是一种有用的思维方式，并回应攻击其可理解性的批评。我对向下因果关系的解释在许多方面与埃利斯最近提出的解释相似。我将采用的总体框架是我在其他地方辩护过的对因果关系的干预主义处理：当Y在X的适当操纵（干预）下发生变化时，X导致Y。当X处于比Y更高的“水平”时，这允许从X到Y的向下因果关系的可能性。真正的向下因果关系的主张必须满足某些附加条件，其中一些已经被埃利斯讨论过了。这些条件包括：（1）X对Y的影响必须是同质的，即X对Y的影响必须是相同的，而不管X是如何在较低水平上“实现”的。此外，（2）向下因果关系的最合理的例子将涉及原因X，在某种意义上，我将试图说明，能够被宏观层面的干预所操纵，这些干预对它们产生协调或有组织的影响，就像当人们通过将气体放入热浴中来操纵气体的温度一样。
This paper defends the notion of downward causation. I will seek to elucidate this notion, explain why it is a useful way of thinking, and respond to criticisms attacking its intelligibility. My account of downward causation will be in many respects similar to the account recently advanced by Ellis. The overall framework I will adopt is the interventionist treatment of causation I have defended elsewhere: X causes Y when Y changes under a suitable manipulation of (intervention on) X. When X is at a higher “level” than Y this allows for the possibility of downward causation from X to Y. True claims of downward causation must meet certain additional conditions, some of which have already been discussed by Ellis. These include (1) the condition that X must have a homogenous effect on Y in the sense that the effect of X on Y must be the same regardless of how X is “realized” at lower levels. In addition, (2) the most plausible examples of downward causation will involve causes X, that in a sense that I will try to specify, are capable of being manipulated by macro-level interventions that have a coordinated or organized impact on them, as when one manipulates the temperature of a gas by placing it in a heat bath.