Begging and bleating: the evolution of parent-offspring signalling
Begging and bleating: the evolution of parent-offspring signalling
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DOI：
10.1098/rstb.2000.0719
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发表时间：
2000-11-29
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Johnstone, RA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Godfray, HCJ;Johnstone, RA
面对进化利益冲突的生物信号进化是进化生态学的一个活跃领域，梅纳德·史密斯对此做出了重要贡献。我们探讨了该领域的主要理论挑战，主要集中在后代如何向父母发出信号时，有潜在的亲子冲突。昂贵的后代引诱（乞讨等）已经被解释为Zael-Grafen诚实的障碍信号，但这已经受到质疑的理由是信号的成本。我们回顾这一争议，也探讨了汇集与分离信号均衡的问题。另一种解释昂贵的乞讨是，这是由于兄弟姐妹的竞争，我们讨论了这些想法和信号模型之间的关系，在家庭中有一个以上的后代。最后，我们考虑信号的不确定性，如何信令模型可以动态，并简要说明它们如何可以进行实验测试。
The evolution of biological signalling in the face of evolutionary conflicts of interest is an active area of evolutionary ecology, and one to which Maynard Smith has made important contributions. We explore the major theoretical challenges in the field, concentrating largely on how offspring signal to their parents when there is the potential for parent-offspring conflict. Costly offspring solicitation (begging etc.) has been interpreted in terms of a Zahavi-Grafen honest handicap signal, but this has been challenged on the grounds of the costs of signalling. We review this controversy and also explore the issue of pooling versus separating signalling equilibrium. An alternative explanation for costly begging is that it is due to sibling competition, and we discuss the relationship between these ideas and signalling models in families with more than one offspring. Finally we consider signal uncertainty; how signalling models can be made dynamic, and briefly how they may be tested experimentally.