Games borrower governments play: the implementation of economic adjustment programmes in Cyprus and Portugal
Games borrower governments play: the implementation of economic adjustment programmes in Cyprus and Portugal
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DOI：
10.1080/01402382.2019.1583482
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发表时间：
2019-11-10
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Schneider, Sebastian
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Luetz, Susanne;Hilgers, Sven;Schneider, Sebastian
关于欧元区危机国家经济调整方案的研究迄今已确认债权国和三驾马车机构的作用，或审查了国内执行进程的经济影响或结构性决定因素。借款国政府作为三驾马车复合体中的战略行为者的作用“被忽视了。本文以塞浦路斯和葡萄牙为例，展示了以改革为导向的借款国政府如何利用与三驾马车的互动来克服否决者对方案实施的反对。利用两级博弈和谈判理论，本研究讨论了借款人应对法院或议会反对的策略，以及没有达成协议的成本。以改革为导向的政府大多利用对国际层面的承诺或三驾马车的压力，对国内反对派采取胁迫性战略。不达成协议的高昂代价似乎是通过胁迫传递政治和市场压力的必要手段。
Research on the Economic Adjustment Programmes (EAPs) for Eurozone crisis countries has so far acknowledged the role of creditor countries and Troika institutions or has examined the economic effects or structural determinants of domestic implementation processes. The role of borrower governments as strategic actors within the Troika complex' has been neglected. Taking Cyprus and Portugal as cases in point, the article shows how reform-oriented borrower governments used the interaction with the Troika to overcome veto player opposition to programme implementation. Drawing on the two-level game and on negotiation theory, the study discusses borrower strategies in response to opposition from the court or parliament, and the costs of no agreement. Reform-oriented governments mostly used commitments to the international level or Troika pressure to pursue coercive strategies vis-a-vis domestic opponents. High costs of no agreement seem to be a necessary means to pass on political and market pressure through coercion.