Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be Bayesian
Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be Bayesian
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动态一致的信念必须是贝叶斯的
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1993.1056
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发表时间：
1993
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
M. Breton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Larry G. Epstein;M. Breton
摘要：诸如艾尔斯伯格悖论之类的实验证据与不确定性下决策的萨维奇模型相矛盾，因为通过单一概率度量来表示偏好背后的信念，没有给信息的不精确程度留下影响决策的空间。从公理上讲，本文表明，即使萨维奇的确定性原则被删除，如果偏好（i）“基于信念”并且（ii）承认响应新信息的动态一致更新，则隐含贝叶斯先验的存在。这一结果对以品味和信仰分离为特征的偏好模型的吸引力提出了质疑。经济文献期刊分类号：D81。
Abstract Experimental evidence such as the Ellsberg Paradox contradicts the Savage model of decision making under uncertainty, since the representation of beliefs underlying preferces by a single probability measure leaves no room for the degree of imprecision in information to affect decisions. Proceeding axiomatically, this paper shows that the existence of a Bayesain prior is implied, even if Savage′s Sure-Thing Principle is deleted, if preferences (i) are "based on beliefs" and (ii) admit dynamically consistent updating in response to new information. The result raises questions about the appeal of models of preference that feature a separation of tastes and beliefs. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D81.