“Moving Umbrella”: Bureaucratic transfers and the comovement of interregional investments in China
“Moving Umbrella”: Bureaucratic transfers and the comovement of interregional investments in China
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102717
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发表时间：
2021-11
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
X. Shi;Tianyang Xi;Xiaobo Zhang;Yifan Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
X. Shi;Tianyang Xi;Xiaobo Zhang;Yifan Zhang
本文研究了中国城市间官僚转移后的区际投资模式。根据企业登记的行政记录，发现地方领导人在都道府县城市间的转移，会使区域间投资沿着转移方向增加约3%。共同迁移的公司以较低的价格购买更大的土地。当顾客离开办公室时，他们也表现出更高的退出可能性。跨地区投资的共同流动并没有增加被转移的领导人的晋升概率，但却使他们面临更高的腐败起诉风险。研究结果强调了企业和官僚之间的个人联系在塑造区域间投资模式方面的重要性。
This paper studies the pattern of interregional investment after bureaucratic transfers across Chinese cities. Using the administrative records of business registration, we find that the transfer of a local leader between prefecture cities is associated with about 3% increase in interregional investment along the direction of transfer. The comoving firms purchase larger parcels of land and at lower prices. They also exhibit a higher likelihood of exiting when the patrons leave the office. Comoving interregional investment does not increase the probability of promotion for transferred leaders, and yet expose them to a higher risk of anticorruption prosecution. The findings highlight the importance of personal connection between firms and bureaucrats in shaping the pattern of interregional investment.