The government's optimal subsidy scheme under Manufacturers' competition of price and product energy efficiency
The government's optimal subsidy scheme under Manufacturers' competition of price and product energy efficiency
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制造商价格与产品能效竞争下政府最优补贴方案
DOI：
10.1016/j.omega.2018.04.006
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发表时间：
2019-04-01
影响因子：
6.9
通讯作者：
Chen, Xiaohong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Huang, Weixiang;Zhou, Wenhui;Chen, Xiaohong
在中国政府各种补贴计划的激励下（例如，2007年推广节能家电，2010年推广节能汽车，2018年推广绿色高效农业机械），我们研究了在两个竞争企业的市场中，政府对节能产品的最优补贴。这些公司的生产成本不同，并在产品价格和产品能效方面展开竞争。政府资助计划订明资助金额及能源消耗水平的认证门槛，若该等能源消耗水平低于该等能源消耗水平，产品便可获得能源效益/节约的认证，从而有资格获得资助。首先推导出在给定补贴方案下产品价格和产品效率策略的子博弈纳什均衡。有趣的是，我们发现，如果补贴过低，低成本企业可能会生产未经认证的产品，而高成本企业可能会生产经过认证的产品。在此基础上，推导了三种不同目标下的政府内生最优补贴方案。即尽量减少总能源消耗、每件产品的平均能源消耗以及单位国内生产总值的平均能源消耗。虽然之前的研究表明，在垄断制造商环境中，最小化前两个目标是等效的，但我们表明，在双寡头竞争环境中，它们并不等效，并且我们证明，在最小化总能源消耗时，最小化平均能源消耗有助于维持产品品种/双寡头结果。在某些条件下，诱导低成本企业生产未认证产品和高成本企业生产认证产品是最优的。此外，我们证明了最小化每件产品和每单位GDP的平均能源消耗的目标导致相同的均衡市场结构。(C) 2018年Elsevier Ltd.出版
As motivated by various Chinese government's subsidy schemes (e.g., promoting energy-efficient home appliances in 2007, energy-saving automobiles in 2010, and green and efficient agricultural machinery in 2018), we study a government's optimal subsidies for energy-efficient products in a market with two competing firms. The firms differ in their production costs and compete on their product prices and product energy efficiencies. The government subsidy scheme specifies the amount of subsidy and the certification threshold of the energy consumption level below which the product is certified for certain energy-efficiency/saving and is thus qualified for the subsidy. We first derive the subgame Nash equilibrium of the product prices and product efficiency strategies given the subsidy scheme. Interestingly, we find that if the subsidy is too low, it is possible that the low-cost firm will produce an uncertified product while the high-cost firm will produce a certified product. Furthermore, we derive the government's endogenous optimal subsidy scheme under three different objectives. i.e., minimizing the total energy consumption, the average energy consumption per product, as well as the average energy consumption per unit of GDP. While previous studies show that minimizing the first two objectives are equivalent in a monopoly manufacturer setting, we show that they are not equivalent in our duopoly competition setting, and we demonstrate that minimizing the average energy consumption helps to sustain the product variety/duopoly outcome, Counterintuitively, when minimizing the total energy consumption, inducing the low-cost firm to produce an uncertified product and the high-cost firm to produce a certified product is optimal under some conditions. Moreover, we demonstrate that both the objectives of minimizing the average energy consumption per product and per unit of GDP result in the same equilibrium market structure. (C) 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd.