Husserl, intersubjectivity and anthropology
Husserl, intersubjectivity and anthropology
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DOI：
10.1177/1463499610370517
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发表时间：
2010-03-01
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Duranti, Alessandro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Duranti, Alessandro
在这篇文章中，通过回到20世纪初哲学家埃德蒙·胡塞尔最初的提法，重新审视了主体间性的概念。在仔细阅读胡塞尔的著作和讲稿的基础上，提出了四个主张，有助于澄清主体间性在什么意义上是一个比目前社会科学中假设的更广泛、更基本的概念。特别是，对于胡塞尔来说，主体间性不仅仅是共享的或相互理解的，而且更接近于他者所在的地方的可能性的概念。此外，主体间性是客观性的来源，并不总是或必然是通过言语交流或其他手段来实现或谈判的东西。事实上，在其最基本的意义上，胡塞尔的主体间性包括一种参与自然和物质世界的模式，这种模式甚至不需要立即可察觉的人类存在。在这一讨论之后，有人建议，胡塞尔著作中的主体间性的全部含义可以作为研究人类状况的基础，从而有机会像美国那样将人类学的所有分支领域结合起来。基于这一目标，本文提出了六个相互关联但又截然不同的主体间性领域。
In this article, the notion of intersubjectivity is re-examined by going back to its original formulation by the philosopher Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the 20th century. On the basis of a careful reading of Husserl's books and lecture notes, four claims are put forward that help clarify in what sense intersubjectivity is a broader and more fundamental notion than currently assumed in the social sciences. In particular, it is argued that for Husserl intersubjectivity is more than shared or mutual understanding and is closer to the notion of the possibility of being in the place where the Other is. Furthermore, intersubjectivity is the source of objectivity and not always or necessarily something to be achieved or negotiated through verbal communication or other means. In fact, in its most basic sense, Husserlian intersubjectivity includes a mode of participation in the natural and material world that does not even require an immediately perceivable human presence. Following this discussion, it is suggested that the full range of meanings of intersubjectivity found in Husserl's writings can be used as the basis for a study of the human condition that has a chance to unite all subfields of anthropology as practiced in the US. With this goal in mind, six related but distinct domains of intersubjectivity are proposed.