Bank Runs and Investment Decisions Revisited
Bank Runs and Investment Decisions Revisited
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重新审视银行挤兑和投资决策
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Todd Keister
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Huberto M. Ennis;Todd Keister
我们研究了银行挤兑的可能性如何影响竞争银行提供的存款合同和投资决策。库珀和罗斯（Ross，1998）已经证明，当发生挤兑的概率很小时，银行将提供一个允许银行挤兑均衡的合约。我们表明，在这种情况下，银行将选择持有一定数量的流动准备金，正好等于如果不发生挤兑，提款需求将是什么。换句话说，将不会持有预防性或“过剩”流动性。这一结果使我们能够确定银行挤兑的可能性如何影响银行选择的非流动性投资水平。我们表明，当清算投资的早期成本是高的，投资水平是减少运行的概率。然而，当清算成本适中时，投资水平实际上是在增加挤兑的概率。
We examine how the possibility of a bank run affects the deposit contract offered and the investment decisions made by a competitive bank. Cooper and Ross (1998) have shown that when the probability of a run is small, the bank will offer a contract that admits a bank-run equilibrium. We show that, in this case, the bank will chose to hold an amount of liquid reserves exactly equal to what withdrawal demand will be if a run does not occur. In other words, precautionary or "excess" liquidity will not be held. This result allows us to determine how the possibility of a bank run affects the level of illiquid investment chosen by a bank. We show that when the cost of liquidating investment early is high, the level of investment is decreasing in the probability of a run. However, when liquidation costs are moderate, the level of investment is actually increasing in the probability of a run.