Optimal Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring in Multimarket Contact

Optimal Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring in Multimarket Contact
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多市场接触中不完善监控下的最优共谋

DOI:
10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.003
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发表时间:
2012
期刊:
Games and Economics Behavior
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Hajime Kobayashi and Katsunori Ohta
Hajime Kobayashi and Katsunori Ohta
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
Youichiro Higashi;Kazuya Hyogo;and Norio Takeoka;武岡則男;宇井貴志;宇井貴志;武岡則男;宇井貴志;Hajime Kobayashi and Katsunori Ohta

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