Environmental regulation and the location of polluting industries
Environmental regulation and the location of polluting industries
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环境监管与污染企业选址
DOI：
10.1007/bf00877499
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发表时间：
1995
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
M. Rauscher
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Rauscher
环境领域的国际税收竞争是否会导致环境监管水平过低以及对环境质量的不可接受的破坏？本文试图在非竞争性部分均衡框架中回答这个问题。有一家公司希望在某个国家建立一家工厂。该论文表明，税收竞争可能导致排放税要么太低要么太高。它们可能太高，以至于无法进行投资，尽管如果各国合作，这将是最佳选择。另一方面，如果存在严重的跨境污染影响，税收降至零的情况就有可能出现。
Does international tax competition in the environmental field lead to undesirably low levels of environmental regulation and to unacceptable disruptions of environmental quality? The paper tries to answer this question in a noncompetitive partial-equilibrium framework. There is one firm that wishes to establish a plant in one ofncountries. The paper shows that tax competition may lead to emission taxes that are either too low or too high. They may be so high that the investment is not undertaken, although this would be optimal if the countries cooperated. On the other end of the spectrum, a scenario in which taxes are driven to zero becomes possible if there are substantial transfrontier pollution effects.