Cross-cultural evidence of cognitive adaptations for social exchange among the Shiwiar of Ecuadorian Amazonia
Cross-cultural evidence of cognitive adaptations for social exchange among the Shiwiar of Ecuadorian Amazonia
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厄瓜多尔亚马逊流域什维亚人社会交换认知适应的跨文化证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
L. Cosmides
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lawrence S. Sugiyama;J. Tooby;L. Cosmides
在进化博弈论的基础上，假设人类有一种进化的认知专长来推理社会交换，包括检测作弊者的子程序。这一假设导致了一个具体的预测：尽管众所周知，人类一般不擅长检测潜在的违反条件规则的行为，但当规则涉及社会交流时，他们应该很容易发现它们，而寻找违规行为相当于寻找作弊者。这一预测随后得到了大量试验的证实。进化分析进一步预测：(I)在人类中，复杂的适应将以物种典型的方式分布；(Ii)与执行适应的进化功能相关的认知组织方面应该更多地缓冲环境和文化变化，而不是与功能无关的方面。在这里，我们报告了测试社会交换推理是否表现出这些适应特性的实验。现有的条件推理测试适用于不识字的实验对象，并被用于厄瓜多尔亚马逊地区的希维亚尔猎人-园艺家。正如预测的那样，Shiwiar的受试者在检测作弊方面与来自发达国家的受试者一样熟练。事实上，希瓦尔狩猎园艺师与哈佛大学本科生之间与作弊者相关的选择频率几乎没有区别。同样，正如预测的那样，文化差异仅限于推理的那些方面，这些方面与作为进化稳定策略的社会交换算法无关。最后，希维亚族受试者在描述性条件句上的表现与发达国家受试者相同。综上所述，这些发现支持这样的假设，即社会交换算法是物种典型的，其与进化稳定策略(ESS)相关的子例程在发育过程中对文化变异具有缓冲作用。
On the basis of evolutionary game theory, it was hypothesized that humans have an evolved cognitive specialization for reasoning about social exchange, including a subroutine for detecting cheaters. This hypothesis led to a specific prediction: Although humans are known to be poor at detecting potential violations of conditional rules in general, they should nevertheless detect them easily when the rule involves social exchange and looking for violations corresponds to looking for cheaters. This prediction was subsequently confirmed by numerous tests. Evolutionary analyses further predict that: (i) in humans, complex adaptations will be distributed in a species-typical fashion; and (ii) aspects of cognitive organization relevant to performing the evolved function of an adaptation should be more buffered against environmental and cultural variation than function-irrelevant aspects. Here we report experiments testing whether social exchange reasoning exhibits these properties of adaptations. Existing tests of conditional reasoning were adapted for nonliterate experimental subjects and were administered to Shiwiar hunter–horticulturalists of the Ecuadorian Amazon. As predicted, Shiwiar subjects were as highly proficient at cheater detection as subjects from developed nations. Indeed, the frequency of cheater-relevant choices among Shiwiar hunter-horticulturalists was indistinguishable from that of Harvard undergraduates. Also as predicted, cultural variation was confined to those aspects of reasoning that are irrelevant to social exchange algorithms functioning as an evolutionarily stable strategy. Finally, Shiwiar subjects displayed the same low performance on descriptive conditionals as subjects from developed nations. Taken together, these findings support the hypotheses that social exchange algorithms are species-typical and that their evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)-relevant subroutines are developmentally buffered against cultural variation.