Financial fragility and recent developments in the Japanese safety net
Financial fragility and recent developments in the Japanese safety net
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金融脆弱性和日本安全网的最新发展
DOI：
10.1093/ssjj/2.1.23
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发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
A. Horiuchi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Horiuchi
20世纪90年代初期的不良贷款问题揭示了日本银行体系的脆弱性，本文考察了财务省的安全网机制是如何造成这种脆弱性的。虽然安全网保护了大多数存款人和其他投资者免受银行倒闭带来的损失，但财政部并没有实施审慎监管，以防止这一全面安全网可能引发的银行管理层的道德风险。监管当局（特别是财政部）与私人银行之间通过所谓的“代课制度”（amokudari system）建立的私人关系，在约束银行管理层方面并不有效。相反;由于严格的限制竞争的法规起到了支撑脆弱的安全网的作用，这种脆弱性在高速增长时期没有显现出来。然而，国内金融市场的放松管制和结构变化消除了这种支持，因此，随着金融放松管制的继续，潜在的脆弱性越来越有可能显现出来。20世纪80年代中期以来的极度宽松货币政策和80年代末后急剧转向紧缩货币政策只是日本银行业动荡的前奏
The bad loan problem of the early 1990s has revealed the fragility of the Japanese banking system.This paper examines how the safety-net mechanism operated by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) created this fragility. Although the safety net protected most depositors and other investors from losses associated with bank failures, MOF did not implement prudential regulations to prevent moral hazard that this comprehensive safety net was likely to elicit from bank management.The personal ties between regulatory authorities, particularly MOF, and private banks, cemented through the so-called amokudari system, were not effective in disciplining bank management. Rather; the amakudari system reduced bank capital and thereby made the banking system more fragile.This fragility did not come to light during the high growth period because stringent competitionrestricting regulations worked to support the fragile safety net. However, deregulation and structural changes in domestic financial markets removed this support.Thus, as financial deregulation proceeded, it became increasingly likely that the potential fragility would surface. The extremely easy money policy since the mid-1980s and the drastic move to a tight money policy after the late 1980s were just the prelude to turmoil in the Japanese banking sector