A Leader-Follower Model for Tradable Performance-Based CO2 Emissions Standards
A Leader-Follower Model for Tradable Performance-Based CO2 Emissions Standards
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基于可交易绩效的二氧化碳排放标准的领导者-追随者模型
DOI：
10.1109/smc.2018.00167
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Siddiqui Afzal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Chen Yihsu;Tanaka Makoto;Siddiqui Afzal
美国清洁能源计划规定了一个州特定的基于性能的二氧化碳排放标准，并授权各州在使用可交易的基于性能或基于质量的许可计划方面具有相当大的灵活性。本文分析了这两种工具时，他们受到不完全竞争。我们发现，虽然交叉补贴固有的性能为基础的工具可能会有效地降低电力价格，它也可以膨胀的能源需求，从而使许可证稀缺。在基于业绩的政策下，一个拥有相对清洁禀赋的主导企业将能够操纵电力市场，并降低许可价格，这可能会使市场结果比基于大众的同行更糟。另一方面，如果领导人拥有相对肮脏的禀赋，“交叉补贴”可能是导致更高社会福利的主导力量。
The U.S. Clean Power Plan stipulates a state-specific performance-based CO2emission standard and delegates considerable flexibility to the states for using either a tradable performance-based or a mass-based permit program. This paper analyzes these two instruments when they are subject to imperfect competition. We show that while the cross-subsidy inherent in the performance-based instrument might effectively reduce power prices, it could also inflate energy demand, thereby rendering permits scarce. A dominant firm with a relatively clean endowment under the performance-based policy would be able to manipulate the electricity market as well as to lower permit prices, which might worsen market outcomes compared to its mass-based counterpart. On the other hand, the "cross-subsidy" could be the dominant force leading to a higher social welfare if the leader has a relatively dirty endowment.